

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.278  
2 August 1966  
ENGLISH

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 2 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. ABERRA

(Ethiopia)

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. C.H. PAULINO PRATES

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Mr. D. POPOV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLED0

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. M.B. BRIMAH

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. B. KAJDY

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. A. COROLIANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I.I. CHEPROV

Mr. V.B. TOULINOV

Mr. A.A. OZADOVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALIL

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

Mr. P.W.J. BUXTON

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER

Mr. L. WEILER

Mr. C.G. BREAM

Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the two hundred and seventh-eighth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): In accordance with the order of work adopted on 12 July (ENDC/PV.272, p.36), we are now discussing collateral measures of disarmament other than a non-proliferation agreement. Most of the measures which have been put before this Committee, however, are directed towards a programme of nuclear disarmament, one which is highly germane to a programme to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and one of which an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes an important part.

The United States has put before this Conference a six-part programme of nuclear disarmament. That programme was contained in the first six parts of President Johnson's message to the Conference on 27 January (ENDC/165). The programme of nuclear disarmament there set forth is a substantial one which, if adopted, would be a magnificent stride towards a peaceful world. Moreover, it is a practical programme; it is one we should be able to negotiate, because it does not adversely affect the interests of any State.

Today I should like to explore somewhat further the measure dealt with in the sixth part of that programme. It is a measure which has not, I fear, figured as importantly in our deliberations as its intrinsic merit justifies. The measure is for a cessation of any increase in the number of strategic offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles and a freeze of their characteristics.

The significance of that measure is based in large part on the fact that in the present balance which exists between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other, a nuclear weapon without an expensive and highly sophisticated means of delivery is not a threat to anyone else so much as it is a dangerous and expensive nuisance to its owner. It is recognized that, should nuclear weapons be introduced into areas where they are not presently part of the military balance, considerably less sophisticated delivery systems might be enough to make them a menace to other nations. However, even in those circumstances, a country considering the introduction of nuclear weapons must consider the means of delivering the nuclear weapons as well as the weapons themselves; and it is for that reason that we think a measure dealing with the means of delivery is appropriate for discussion at the present time.

(Mr. Fisher, United States)

Before dealing further with that measure, I should like to review briefly the other five parts of our six-part programme of nuclear disarmament.

The first part of the programme is, of course, the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty.

The second part is to secure, either through a non-proliferation treaty or through efforts outside it, the application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent international safeguards over relevant peaceful nuclear activities. That measure was developed in considerable detail by the United States delegation in its statement at the last meeting of this Committee; and I should like only to add that the United States considers it a measure of the highest importance. All States which are interested in the objectives of non-proliferation should be prepared to see to it that no nuclear materials or devices are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States without obtaining workable and efficient assurances that those materials will not be used for nuclear explosions.

The third part is to strengthen United Nations and other international security arrangements so that those States which forswear nuclear weapons may do so without fear.

The fourth and fifth parts relate to measures by which the nuclear States would restrict their own nuclear arsenals. As I have pointed out once before in this Committee, we should bear in mind that when we speak of halting and turning back the arms race in nuclear weapons we should be concerned with at least two aspects of that race -- two aspects as far as the war-heads are concerned. The world's build-up of nuclear weapons proceeds both qualitatively -- that is, by improving the effectiveness of such weapons through continued testing -- and quantitatively -- that is, by increasing the number of such weapons by continued production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

We have, of course, put a real curb on the qualitative aspect of the arms race in nuclear weapons by agreeing to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/10C/Rev.1). In particular, that treaty is a real curb on the development of nuclear weapons in the higher-yield ranges -- weapons of almost unbelievable destructive capability.

As has been pointed out many times before, the United States would, of course, like to go further and halt the qualitative aspect of the arms race in nuclear weapons by extending the limited test ban to cover underground nuclear tests. That is the fourth part of the United States programme of nuclear disarmament. For

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such an extension the United States would require only inspections of the number and kind which modern science shows to be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that such a treaty is being faithfully observed.

At the same time as we are striving to halt the qualitative aspects of the nuclear arms race, we should attempt also to curb the quantitative aspects of the arms race in nuclear weapons by halting the build-up of arsenals of nuclear weapons and by destroying a large number of the weapons at present held in stockpiles. The limitation of the further production of nuclear weapons by halting production of the weapon-grade fissionable material which is the essential element of their manufacture is the fifth measure in the six-part programme of nuclear disarmament which has been advanced by the United States.

The sixth part of that programme, which we should like to explore further today, relates, as I indicated earlier in my remarks, to a freeze of the number and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems. For some time the United States has had a proposal before this Committee calling for the United States and the Soviet Union and our respective allies to agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles (ENDC/120). It is not necessary to review now in detail the basic elements of the freeze proposal which we have recommended for exploration. It is not necessary to repeat the suggested procedures for verification of that measure which we have recommended for detailed discussion and negotiation by this Conference.

It should be clear to this Committee that a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles would have a decisive impact on the burgeoning arms race in ever more deadly, sophisticated and costly weapons of mass destruction. If agreement on a freeze could be reached and implemented, it would constitute a practical step in the process of disarmament. It would open possible paths to reductions in all types of armaments from existing levels. It would facilitate progress towards our mutual goal of general and complete disarmament.

My Government has outlined, in its proposal for freezing offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems, the kinds of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which should be included (ENDC/PV.211). It has recommended controls over missile launchers and launching facilities as well as boosters for use in space programmes. It has suggested limitations on the testing and firing of new

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and existing missiles. In setting forth that exploratory proposal the United States delegation chose to adopt a completely flexible approach with respect to both the elements of the proposal and the manner in which discussions and negotiations should proceed. We have also elaborated on that proposal for a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle freeze by setting forth procedures for verification which would not threaten the security interests of any State involved.

Unfortunately, the reply to our call has not been very encouraging. We have heard charges that the United States wants to exploit the inspection rights of a measure which is described as containing no disarmament in order to obtain target information on critical and secret Soviet armed forces, defence systems and defence industry. It is implied that the United States, having obtained that information, would be able to launch a surprise counterforce strike against the factories and defence installations of the Soviet Union and other socialist States.

I submit that any objective analysis of that proposal will indicate that such a charge is quite unfounded. This is made quite clear by observing the nature of the freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles that my Government is proposing and the nature of the verification system that it is proposing to go along with it. The discouraging aspect of that charge -- and I say this with the greatest personal respect -- is that it indicates that our Soviet colleagues have not really understood the far-reaching implications of the measure we are now discussing.

Despite the difficulties we have had in engaging our Soviet colleagues in a discussion of the issues involved in my Government's proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the United States has nevertheless sought the basis for a compromise. We have sought a compromise which might permit the taking of a first step which might finally break the deadlock and enable the disarmament process to begin. With that purpose in mind Mr. Goldberg, in a speech before the General Assembly in September 1965, said that whereas we should continue to explore a freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles, if progress could be made in that field the United States would also be willing to explore the possibility of significant reductions in such vehicles.

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We have been encouraged by the support given to our proposal by many nations both in the United Nations General Assembly and here in this Committee. That sustains us in our belief that meaningful progress in a first-step proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles could result indeed in breaking the deadlock which has for so long prevented us from beginning the disarmament process. We have not, however, been encouraged by the silence of our Soviet colleagues.

A number of times during the past several years my delegation has pointed out to this Committee the actual and planned increases by my country in its strategic nuclear delivery forces. We did so to illustrate for our part the substantial amount of nuclear delivery systems which would not have been built had the United States freeze proposal been put into effect during 1964. As I have stressed before, such a measure as we are proposing would have been --- and can be --- an effective non-armament measure.

We assume, of course, from the public statements made by high military and political authorities of the Soviet Union -- statements which assure the world of its formidable strategic rocket and other forces --- that during the period from 1964 to date their country's strategic delivery inventories have grown substantially as ours have. Unfortunately, however, while our Soviet colleagues have often told this Committee about the military plans and forces of the United States, which they are able to do quite properly by drawing on readily available and officially released information, they have been unwilling up to now to indicate to this Committee that the strategic arms race which we all deplore is at least two-sided.

Recently we have heard statements by several members of the Committee to the effect that unless something is done soon to arrest the costly and seemingly inexorable competition in the field of strategic arms there is grave danger that new and more lethal offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems will be deployed.

I hardly need to repeat that the freeze proposal we are now recommending for exploration deals with both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery systems. Therefore it deals directly with the problem which has been behind the emphasis that many of the delegations here have placed on extending the limited test ban to all nuclear tests. If our concern is that a continuation of underground tests might lead to a break-through which would lead to a new generation of offensive and

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defensive missiles and a consequent new, dangerous and destabilizing phase of the arms race --- and that is a quite proper and responsible concern ---, should we not attempt to deal with this problem directly, by the proposal which I have been exploring today, at the same time as we try to limit it peripherally by our efforts --- and they are quite proper efforts --- to agree on a comprehensive test ban?

I think it is clear from these brief comments why my Government believes it is urgent to undertake serious and extensive discussions of the issues and considerations involved in our proposal to halt now and begin to turn back the strategic nuclear arms race in the field of delivery vehicles as well as in the other fields which are contained in the six-part programme of nuclear disarmament described at the beginning of my remarks.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today we have listened to the statement of the representative of the United States on certain collateral measures. We, in our turn, should like to avail ourselves of today's meeting in order to state our position on collateral measures other than the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

During the discussions that have taken place in our Committee on disarmament questions there has appeared very clearly the desire of most of the participants in the negotiations to take immediate measures to reduce and avert the threat of a nuclear war. In the approach to the solution of this problem an important place is assigned to such topical questions as the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of their use and the cessation of underground nuclear tests. At the same time we must give attention to the consideration of other urgent and long overdue measures which are also aimed at eliminating the nuclear danger and at strengthening peace.

The Soviet delegation, prompted by the desire to ensure a solution of the problem of disarmament and to contribute towards freeing mankind from the danger of a nuclear catastrophe, would like in its statement today to draw the attention of members of the Committee to two very important questions: the question of the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom, and the question of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as many non-aligned countries, have long been urging the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries and the withdrawal of all foreign troops therefrom. The numerous military bases established on the territories of other States, above all by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, are a source of constant international tension and a threat to world peace. They represent a military backing for the policy "from a position of strength", and are designed to keep the security of States under a threat and to serve as an instrument for intervening in the internal affairs of other peoples. Foreign military bases on the territories of other countries have been and still are an instrument of the policy of colonialism. Their purpose is to safeguard the political and economic interests of American, British, Portuguese and other monopolies in their colonies and in the young States which have recently freed themselves from colonial dependence.

The war of aggression which the United States is waging against the people of Viet-Nam reveals in the most convincing way the true role of United States military bases abroad as spring-boards for aggression and as focal points of war, colonialism and tension. It is from numerous military bases situated in South Viet-Nam, Thailand, Okinawa and other parts of South-East Asia and the Far East that the United States is waging its aggression against the people of Viet-Nam, undertaking air bombardments of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and carrying out flights over certain areas of Laos and Cambodia.

The events in South-East Asia, where the United States military bases have played the role of a fuse in the expanding war in Viet-Nam, compel us to approach the question of the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries from a long-term point of view. In fact, what is happening today in South-East Asia may happen tomorrow in other parts of the world where foreign military bases and troops are located.

Can one regard as normal the fact that the United States has at present on foreign territory over four hundred major military bases and is maintaining abroad more than a million soldiers and officers? Major United States military bases are located in nearly forty countries of the world. It is quite obvious that the continuance of such a situation, which is in blatant contradiction with the interests of the safeguarding of peace, is bound to cause tension in international relations and creates a situation which fosters the growth of suspicion and mistrust and increases the danger of a nuclear war.

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Sometimes Western statesmen try in their statements to create the impression that the United States and the United Kingdom are carrying out a policy of "military withdrawal" abroad. The facts show that actually the Western Powers are far from reviewing their policy in this respect. The liquidation of individual obsolete bases is being carried out by them in order to modernize and increase the efficiency of their system of bases as a whole. Moreover, this system is expanding; it is spreading out all over the world and encompassing more and more regions. This is shown, for instance, by the reports that the United Kingdom and the United States are planning and carrying out the construction of new military bases on foreign territories.

The establishment and modernization of United States military bases have assumed a particularly wide range in South-East Asia. Expenditures on these bases are estimated at \$1,500 million. In expanding on an ever wider scale its war of aggression against the people of Viet-Nam, the United States has not only built numerous military bases in South Viet-Nam but is constantly increasing its military potential in other countries of this region. Thailand, for instance, where the United States is speeding up the construction of military bases, is called by the United States Press the "second front" of the war against Viet-Nam. The number of United States troops stationed there has doubled since January of this year and has now reached 25,000, two-thirds of them being personnel of the United States Air Force. That is more than there were in Viet-Nam in 1963.

The chain of military bases is expanding also on the islands in the Indian Ocean. Besides the British military bases on the Maldivé Islands, the United Kingdom and the United States are planning to establish a network of joint bases on the Chagos Islands, the Seychelles and Mauritius. At the end of last year the British Government formed a new colony on a group of islands in the Indian Ocean -- "British Territory in the Indian Ocean". The establishment of this colony was viewed as being motivated by strictly military considerations, as the initial stage of the establishment of naval and air-force bases on these islands. It is obvious that military bases in that region will create a threat to the States of Asia and Africa.

Furthermore, the British Government is continuing to carry out the policy of a military presence in the countries and regions "East of Suez" -- that is, the Afro-Asian countries. British troops are stationed at numerous bases, forming a single strategic complex. Large numbers of British troops remain in Southern Arabia and Malaysia. One cannot fail to note an important characteristic of the use of British bases: all

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of them serve the interests of imperialism as a whole. The bases at Aden, Singapore and other places are used by ships of the countries of CENTO and SEATO. United States ships taking part in the aggressive actions of the United States against the people of Viet-Nam are often refitted at Singapore. The British base in Cyprus threatens the security of the countries of the Near East.

Military bases on foreign territories represent a serious threat to the security of the countries in which they are located. Many of these bases, which serve as a means of delivering strategic nuclear weapons to their targets, greatly increase the danger of a nuclear war. The existence of foreign military bases has been more than once in the past, and can become again in the future, a cause of unfortunate accidents such as the crashing of a United States bomber with nuclear bombs aboard which occurred over the south coast of Spain at the beginning of this year.

In view of the fact that the continuation of flights of aircraft with nuclear weapons aboard over the territory of other countries represents a grave danger to peace, the Soviet delegation renews its proposal (ENDC/PV.241, pp.8,9) that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should issue an appeal for the immediate ending of flights of aircraft with nuclear weapons beyond the national borders of States. We are convinced that such a measure would contribute to the security of all peoples.

For the overwhelming majority of States there is, strictly speaking, no question whether or not foreign military bases on the territories of other countries should be eliminated. The Second Conference of Heads of State and Government of Non-Aligned Countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe, held in Cairo in October 1964, reiterated the demands of many other international conferences and meetings of non-aligned countries, declared "its full support to the countries which are seeking to secure the evacuation of foreign bases on their territory", and called upon "all States maintaining troops and bases in other countries to remove them forthwith" (A/5763, p.25). At present, in the light of events in South-East Asia, in the Near and Middle East, in Africa and in Latin America, that demand of the second Cairo Conference sounds particularly topical.

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We should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that, in the resolution adopted at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly regarding the implementation of the Declaration "on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples", there is a clear appeal to all colonial Powers "to dismantle the military bases installed in colonial Territories and to refrain from establishing new ones" (A/RES/2105 (XX)). Sufficient time has already gone by since the adoption of that resolution, but the Western Powers that have military bases in colonial territories have still not taken any practical steps to carry out the aforesaid resolution and to dismantle their military bases. Moreover, the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal and other colonial Powers are doing all they can to keep their existing bases and to create new ones in the colonial territories and in foreign countries. Thus they show their defiance of the resolutions of the United Nations and disregard the clearly-expressed will of many countries of the world.

The representatives of the United States and other Western Powers, in trying to justify the locating of their military bases and troops in the territory of other countries, assert that they maintain their bases and troops abroad with the consent and approval of the States on whose territories these bases and troops are located. One may ask: why then does the United States cling so stubbornly to its military base at Guantanamo in the territory of the Republic of Cuba? As is well known, the Government of Cuba and the whole of the Cuban people emphatically demand the dismantling of the United States military base at Guantanamo, whence the United States is carrying out provocative acts against free Cuba. The Soviet Union and all peace-loving States fully support the demand of the Republic of Cuba that the United States military base at Guantanamo should be dismantled.

One may also ask: are the British military bases in Cyprus being maintained with the consent of the Government of Cyprus? As far back as December 1964 the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, stated to representatives of the Press: "The agreements under which foreign bases and foreign troops are located in Cyprus restrict our independence and must therefore be repealed". But there is no evidence that the United Kingdom has taken any steps to do away with its bases in Cyprus, although in this case there is the clearly-expressed will of the Cypriot people, who have declared themselves against the maintenance of foreign military bases on their territory.

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The arguments which the Western delegations put forward to justify the locating of their military bases on the territories of other countries do not stand up to criticism. Thus the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, dealing with the Soviet proposal to eliminate foreign military bases (ENDC/123), asserted on 21 April that this proposal "is merely a ... measure for breaking up the defensive NATO alliance ... (ENDC/PV.258, p.16). Of course, if the Western Powers declare all proposals on disarmament questions to be contrary to the interests of the NATO bloc, then the Eighteen-Nation Committee has very little chance of making progress in solving such questions.

The interests of international security insistently require that, in order to diminish the threat of a nuclear war and to make a contribution to the cause of disarmament, foreign military bases should be eliminated, and foreign troops withdrawn from the territories of other countries to within the national borders of States. The Soviet delegation considers that this important question should be examined and a way found towards solving it. It has long been high time to put an end to the maintenance of military bases and armed forces on the territories of other countries, since they create a threat to the peace and security of States. The Soviet Union will seek to achieve this objective in the interests of strengthening world peace and the security of the peoples.

Another important matter having a direct bearing on the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war is the question of establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. This question, like that of the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries, has been raised on many occasions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, at sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and in other international forums. We have all seen that the idea of establishing denuclearized zones -- an idea which originated some years ago -- has confirmed its vitality.

At present, there are numerous projects and plans for establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world: in Central Europe, Northern Europe, the Mediterranean basin, the Balkans and the Adriatic, in the Near and Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America, in the area of the Pacific Ocean, and so forth. In recent years some practical steps have been taken to convert into reality this idea of establishing denuclearized zones. We should like to recall in this connexion that

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in December 1959 an international convention on the Antarctic was concluded, which prohibits the establishment of military bases and fortifications and the carrying out of nuclear explosions in that area, and which in fact establishes for that continent the status of a denuclearized zone.

In 1963, at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, a resolution was unanimously adopted calling on all States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or installing such weapons on celestial bodies (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117). In other words, the whole of outer space was proclaimed a denuclearized zone. The question arises: is the guaranteeing of such conditions on earth, whereby the threat of a nuclear war would be reduced and averted, a less topical and urgent problem?

The overwhelming majority of countries Members of the United Nations have expressed themselves in favour of establishing denuclearized zones. At the twentieth session of the General Assembly the "Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa" was adopted by 105 votes. In the Declaration it is noted "that proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various other areas of the world have also met with general approval", and "that the denuclearization of various areas of the world would help to achieve the desired goal of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons" (A/RES/2033 (XX); ENDC/162). The discussion at the twentieth session of the United Nations General Assembly of the question of proclaiming Africa a denuclearized zone, and the adoption of the aforesaid Declaration, showed quite clearly the need for the speediest possible implementation of that measure, as well as the importance of establishing denuclearized zones in other areas of the world.

The Soviet Union is a resolute advocate of the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, since the accomplishment of this measure would open the way to an effective restriction of the sphere of location and use of nuclear weapons and consequently to a diminution of the threat of nuclear war and to a limitation of the arms race. In this connexion we should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the urgent need to establish denuclearized zones in the European continent, above all in Central Europe, where enormous stocks of nuclear weapons have been accumulated and where the armed forces of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries confront each other directly.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The Soviet Union, as has been stated repeatedly, fully supports the proposals of the Polish People's Republic for creating a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1) and "for freezing nuclear weapons in that area" (ENDC/PV.189, p.6). We consider that the implementation of these proposals, which are supported by all the socialist States and are meeting with international approval on an ever wider scale, would be an exceptionally important measure aimed at putting an end to the nuclear arms race in Central Europe, reducing international tension and strengthening mutual trust.

The Soviet Government also attaches great importance to the constructive proposals of the German Democratic Republic contained in the Statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/168) in which it solemnly declares its readiness to assume the obligation of renouncing nuclear weapons if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is likewise ready to assume a similar obligation. The purpose of reducing the threat of a nuclear war in Europe is also served by the appeal of the German Democratic Republic to the nuclear Powers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from German territory, if they have stationed them on German soil, and in future to keep it free of nuclear weapons. These proposals of the Government of the German Democratic Republic are imbued with concern for the strengthening of peace, and the sooner they are carried out the better it will be for international security.

In drawing the attention of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the need to remove nuclear weapons from Central Europe and to establish a nuclear-free zone there, the Soviet delegation is prompted by the fact that the situation in this region continues to develop in a dangerous direction. A direct threat to peace in Europe and to the security of the European peoples, and of other peoples also, is inherent in the present policy of the United States, which aims at re-arming West Germany and at forming a military alliance with forces that are openly advocating a revision of European frontiers and a re-examination of the consequences of the Second World War.

In the very centre of Europe, where twice in the last fifty years German militarism has passed through with fire and sword, one of the most intricate hubs of

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European and international conflict has been formed. It is there that plans for aggression are again being hatched. The increasingly insistent demand of the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany to get hold of nuclear weapons brings forward in all its acuteness the problem of setting up a reliable barrier to the nuclear arming of West Germany. By pursuing a policy aimed at giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons, and by refusing to give the undertakings involved in the establishment of nuclear-free zones in Europe, the United States, the United Kingdom and other NATO countries are obstructing the solution of this important international problem.

The establishment of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe in accordance with the proposal of the Polish People's Republic, as well as the adoption of the proposals of the German Democratic Republic, could be the measures that would forestall a dangerous course of events in Europe, and would be a major contribution towards improving the international situation. We are also in favour of establishing nuclear-free zones in Northern Europe, in the Balkans and the Adriatic, in the Mediterranean area, and in other parts of the world.

The Soviet Union considers that, in the interests of strengthening world peace and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the obligations concerning the establishment of nuclear-free zones could be assumed not only by groups of States comprising whole continents or large geographical areas, but also by individual countries. In this respect, the decision of the Government of Ceylon on 23 January 1964 to ban the entry into the ports of Ceylon of foreign vessels with nuclear weapons on board, and the landing on Ceylonese aerodromes of aircraft with nuclear bombs, is a graphic example of possible ways of establishing a nuclear-free zone within the territorial limits of one country. The Soviet Government has expressed its positive appreciation of this decision of the Government of Ceylon.

In drawing the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to the question of establishing nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, we deem it essential to emphasize the Soviet Union's willingness to assume an obligation to respect the status of any denuclearized zones which may be established provided that other nuclear Powers assume similar obligations (ENDC/167, p.3).

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation, in proposing the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other countries and the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, would like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that the recent conference in Bucharest of the countries parties to the Warsaw Pact devoted particular attention to these questions. The Bucharest Declaration, adopted at that conference, stresses in particular the urgent need for the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries, as well as the need for the establishment of nuclear-free zones on the European continent. The implementation of all those measures would unquestionably be a serious contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament and would be welcomed with satisfaction by all the peoples of the world.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I give the floor to the representative of the United States, who wishes to exercise the right of reply.

Mr. FISHER (United States of America): I listened with interest, as I always do, to the remarks of our Soviet colleague. He said quite a few things about United States policy in a variety of places; one might say that he covered a variety of United States policies almost around the world. It would not be appropriate or helpful to the work of this Committee for me to attempt to reply now to his various points one by one; but I thought it would be worth at least sixty seconds of the Committee's time to make clear that, as I think the members already know, my silence on those subjects does not mean acquiescence. I shall of course study Mr. Roshchin's remarks carefully -- I think it goes without saying that I always do -- and if there is any point on which the position of the United States has not already been made clear I shall comment on it at the appropriate time. Forgive me for making this second intervention, but I felt it to be called for.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 278th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Dejazmatch Amha Aberra, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States and the USSR.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 4 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.